The Battle of Cheron: After Action Report

After-Action Reports: Battle of Cheron, 12-13 August 2160- Commanding Officer, Task Force 40

CHM-70/2C>A
From: Commanding Officer, Task Force 40.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UE Sixth Fleet.
Via: Commander, Task Force 31.
Subject: Report of Action — 12-13 August 2160.

Reference: UESN Regulations, Art. 472 and Art. 478.

  1. Enclosures are forwarded herewith. Where discrepancies exist between Charger and Liberator reports, the Charger report should be taken as the more accurate.
    • CO Krechet (CCM-1) of 16 November 2157, with enclosures thereto.
    • CO Tannhäuser (CHM-55) of 17 November 2157, with enclosures thereto.
    • CO Excelsior (CH-39) of 23 November 2157, with enclosures thereto.
    • XO Klinge (APA-4) of 28 November 2157, less enclosure.
    • Sensor records Yamamoto (CC-21) of 22 October 2157, less enclosure.
  2. On 11 August, Task Force 40 consisted of 8 CHM, 7 CVM, 2 FMM, 22 CEM, 7 CLM, 2 APM, 3 AOM, 2 ACRM.
    • UES Trafalgar CHM-61 Tannhäuser-class
    • UES Thermopylae CHM-65 Tannhäuser-class
    • UES Shiloh CHM-68 Tannhäuser-class
    • UES Charger CHM-72 Conqueror-class
    • UES Liberator CHM-73 Conqueror-class
    • UES Damocles CHM-75 Conqueror-class
    • UES Hercules CHM-79 Conqueror-class
    • UES Furies CHM-84 Conqueror-class
    • UES Nimitz CVM-8 Yorktown-class
    • UES Sherman CVM-25 Yorktown-class
    • UES Valley Forge CVM-30 Yorktown-class
    • UES Akagi CVM-32 Yorktown-class
    • UES Ticonderoga CVM-44 Yorktown-class
    • UES Coral Sea CVM-47 Yorktown-class
    • UES Kearsarge CVM-49 Yorktown-class
    • UES Perry FMM-5 Farragut-class
    • UES Arleigh Burke FMM-7 Farragut-class
    • UES Navaga CEM-5 Torsk-class
    • UES Porpoise CEM-7 Torsk-class
    • UES Hai Lung CEM-14 Torsk-class
    • UES Phaeton CEM-18 Powhatan-class
    • UES Nantucket CEM-21 Powhatan-class
    • UES Albemarle CEM-25 Powhatan-class
    • UES Portsmouth CEM-28 Powhatan-class
    • UES Manassas CEM-32 Powhatan-class
    • UES Passaic CEM-39 Powhatan-class
    • UES Chesapeake CEM-40 Powhatan-class
    • UES Hampton Roads CEM-45 Powhatan-class
    • UES Columbine CEM-46 Powhatan-class
    • UES Lincoln CEM-48 Powhatan-class
    • UES Monitor CEM-50 Powhatan-class
    • UES Robert E. Lee CEM-53 Powhatan-class
    • UES Arkansas CEM-55 Powhatan-class
    • UES Sumter CEM-59 Powhatan-class
    • UES Tennessee CEM-60 Powhatan-class
    • UES Florida CHM-62 Powhatan-class
    • UES Atlanta CHM-68 Powhatan-class
    • UES du Pont CEM-70 Powhatan-class
    • UES Appomattox CEM-71 Powhatan-class
    • UES Nova CLM-105 Comet-class
    • UES Nebula CLM-107 Comet-class
    • UES Eclipse CLM-109 Comet-class
    • UES Galaxy CLM-114 Comet-class
    • UES Proxima CLM-116 Comet-class
    • UES Luna CLM-120 Comet-class
    • UES Jupiter CLM-122 Comet-class
    • UES Cho Oyu APM-33 Olympus Mons-class
    • UES Vesuvius APM-54 Olympus Mons-class
    • UES Newcomb AOM-28 Reid Fleming-class
    • UES Tucker AOM-32 Reid Fleming-class
    • UES DeMarco AOM-35 Reid Fleming-class
    • 3 ATM
    • 4 AMM
    • UES Siemens ACRM-7 Marconi-class
    • UES Alexanderson ACRM-11 Marconi-class
    • 2 LAA, 3 LAT, 1 LAC, 3 LHK
  3. The tally of Romulan ships encountered is as follows:
    • 14 CABBAGE-class heavy cruisers
    • 18 CHOWDER-class cruisers
    • 10 CLAVICLE-class cruisers
    • 3 VINEGAR-class fighter carriers
    • 9 TONSIL-class fuelers
    • 2 SYRUP-class troop carriers
    • 15 ELBOW-class escort cruisers
  4. The following is a general outline of the operations of Task Force 40 during the two days, 12-13 August, during which attacks against Romulan forces took place near Cheron. All times given are Earth Standard.
  5. Tuesday, 12 August.
    1. We received our final sensor contact report via message probe from Krechet at 1640. Task Force 12 was last reported at 0.65 LY distant to point RZ. Task Force 25 headed toward contact at Warp 2.85. Our estimate of enemy movements was that they would continue on course for Deneva (heading 142 mark 5) until sensor contact. We felt that we had to hit them before they could re-form into attack formation, both to use the element of surprise and to ensure our own safety.
    2. When we got within 80 AU of point RZ, about 1945, we dropped out of warp and formed up into attack groups. The formations were as follows: (1) Tannhäuser, Vicksburg, Marathon, and Bowen, (2) Excelsior, Johannesburg, Agata, and Yamamoto. (3) Klinge, and Mount Beauty, which were held back for the initial attack. Formation time was about twenty minutes.
    3. At 2010 the Tannhäuser attack group jumped to Warp 3.1 on a direct intercept course with the Romulan fleet. By this time the enemy was aware of our presence — they had dropped out of warp and seemed to be attempting to re-form into attack formation. The Tannhäuser group fired a full salvo of missiles and immediately broke formation in evasive maneuvers. Responding fire was limited and easily handled by area-defense missiles. Three ELBOW-class escorts and one CABBAGE-class cruiser were destroyed immediately, and it is believed four other ships took moderate damage. The attack group escaped with no losses, on heading 98 mark 25.
    4. Based on reports from the Tannhäuser, which indicated the enemy was seriously disorganized, I decided to press the attack and launch the Excelsior group in a second wave, with the Tannhäuser group following for a second pass, leaving only Klinge and Mount Beauty in reserve. At 2045 the Excelsior attack group jumped to Warp 2.55. At the same time, the Tannhäuser group reversed course and commenced a simultaneous attack along a parabolic vector. Owing to their superior speed, the Tannhäuser group attacked at about the same time as the Excelsior group, despite their longer attack vector. This had the secondary but welcome effect of splitting the Romulan’s response fire.
    5. As the Excelsior group broke off after making its attack, a squadron of 6 ELBOWs pursued, scoring several near-misses and causing moderate damage to Yamamoto. Marathon and Bowen moved in and destroyed 3 ELBOWs and drove off the rest.
    6. At this point in the action a group of 4 CABBAGEs cruisers broke off and pressed the attack against our somewhat divided forces while the remaining ships escaped at warp. At the same time, Krechet arrived in the vicinity (returning from its surveillance mission trailing the Romulan fleet) and made a courageous solo attack run against the 4 attacking CABBAGEs, disrupting their advance and diverting their attention long enough for Excelsior, Johannesburg, and Agata to enter close attack range. As the 4 enemy CABBAGEs turned to engage Excelsior and Johannesburg, Krechet and Agata scored direct hits on all 4 CABBAGEs.
    7. Bowen, Yamamoto, and Mount Beauty were detailed to follow the last known course of the Romulan fleet and initiate a search pattern for the survivors. Given the group’s initial lack of success, I believe that the Romulans deployed some type of sensor countermeasures which hampered detection of their vessels beyond approximately 30 AU.
    8. After the departure of the main Romulan force and the defeat of the diversionary CABBAGEs, long-range sensors detected a single CABBAGE left behind, apparently adrift and powerless. Johannesburg and Klinge were directed to approach for short-range scan and possible boarding. As Klinge approached to 1,500 kilometers (contrary to my orders to hold a distance of 2,000 kilometers), the CABBAGE exploded. At the time, we believed that the vessel had suffered battle damage to its reactor core which caused the breach. However, later experiences with the remainder of the Romulan fleet on 23 October lead me to believe that this ship deliberately self-destructed to prevent us from gaining further intelligence on their ship and to avoid capture.
  6. Wednesday, 13 August.
    1. After regrouping after the first three attacks, Task Force 25 held position approximately 15 AU distant to point RZ. A brief sensor contact reported by Bowen at 0430 indicated that the Romulan ships were located approximately 230 AU distant to the bulk of Task Force 25 current location. Upon arriving in the vicinity, Bowen found only a single ELBOW — obviously a decoy. The ELBOW engaged Bowen and was destroyed by return fire. The Bowen and accompanying ships resumed their search pattern, and I further detailed Agata and Johannesburg to begin a similar search pattern.
    2. I meanwhile ordered the remainder of Task Force 25 to fall back along the vector towards Deneva, working under the assumption that the Romulan fleet was attempting to bypass our forces and resume their course. The force assumed a position approximately 800 AU distant to point RZ, hopefully placing us in a better position to intercept the Romulan fleet once they were found. A message probe was dispatched to Task Force 12 informing them of the change of location.
    3. By 1200 the situation which presented itself that afternoon was that no targets had been identified in a search area defined by a 30º cone with the central vector as the last known course of the Romulan fleet. Accordingly we took course heading 232 mark 355 in an attempt to head off the Romulan fleet, operating under the assumption that they had already resumed course towards Deneva.
    4. At approximately 1630 Yamamoto reported detecting a group of warp signatures bearing 143 mark 5 at 180 AU distant to point RZ and 720 AU distant to Task Force 25 — the Romulan fleet had resumed course. The origin of these signatures, however was from within the region which had been searched by Yamamoto. Presumably they had been employing further countermeasures to prevent detection. I ordered all ships to intercept. Mount Beauty was ordered to join the Excelsior attack group for the remainder engagement. Krechet was ordered to join the Tannhäuser attack group for the remainder of the engagement.
    5. The Tannhäuser group immediately assumed intercept course at Warp 3.2. Given the distance, Excelsior (the only fusion-powered vessel not assigned search duty) was not fast enough to keep up with the rest of the group, and they were left behind for this engagement. Excelsior nevertheless maintained its maximum attainable intercept speed of Warp 2.6.
    6. attack commenced at 1845.
    7. pretty pitched battle. AMs make first attack, sensor group joins in afterwards. Yamamoto destroyed, Agata takes a crippling hit and withdraws.
    8. at abbout 2015 the UESN decides to withdraw to assess damages and make quick repairs, but to maintain constant sensor contact with enemy fleet so as not to lose them — dispatch s/a shuttles to track the enemy. Romulans launch a couple of rear-guard attacks, both driven off
    9. The situation which presented itself that night was that no targets had been sighted for 250 miles ahead on the last reported course of the enemy, and some planes reported the weather ahead as not so favorable. I figured that the enemy DDs would report our attack and that they might either get the protection of bad weather ahead or else change course to the westward to head for Japan and to throw us off. In either event a change in our course to the westward seemed desirable. Accordingly we took course 280°, speed 15 knots, for the rest of the night, and at daylight launched a 200 mile search, covering 180°-360°. That night the undesirability of running down any enemy BBs in the dark presented itself as a reason for slowing, as did the growing shortage of fuel in DDs.
  7. Believe that the Romulan fleet is crippled — advise immediate offensive to take advantage of this weakness.
  8. The following is a brief summary of the more important points brought out by the action:
    1. CABBAGE-class cruisers have been confirmed to carry at least six lasers of at least 2.67 MW which were used in anti-missile defense.
    2. Sensor countermeasures are confirmed to be in use by Romulan ships in order to avoid long-range detection. (Sensor records enclosed.) Methods of defeating these countermeasures are urgently needed.
    3. Battle records describe a new CABBAGE-type missile/fighter carrier. This design has been designated VINEGAR-class.
    4. In duel between CHs or CCs side which is able to strike first blow without being itself hit wins.
    5. Attack missiles with greater explosive yield are needed. With present warheads, missiles must detonate within 1500 meters of target to cause appreciable damage; such targeting is difficult at best during high-warp attack runs.
    6. CH attack runs on CEs during general fleet action are not profitable because of the difficulty of obtaining hits on such a small and highly maneuverable target. Such attacks should not be made if a larger and more valuable target is available.
    7. Mobile subspace transmitter platforms are urgently needed for faster communication between fleet units.
    8. Early and accurate information of movements of an enemy force to be attacked is essential for successful fleet operations. This should be obtained, whenever possible, by other than CH or CC vessels, both to retain maximum cruiser striking power and to avoid disclosing the fact that any cruisers are in the area.
    9. When fleet groups are composed of both fusion and M/AM cruisers, ships should be organized according to maximum speed, in order to allow maximum striking power during full-speed attack runs.
    10. Romulan vessels are likely to self-destruct rather than allow capture.

[signed]
D. CARLSON, Commodore, UESN 6th Fleet.

Source: Commander in Chief, Sixth Fleet report, Serial 01999 of 15 August 2160, Earth-Romulan War action reports, Interplanetary Archives and Records Administration, (Com: STFL.LNX 0195-581 302-4126).